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In this paper we review the evolution of the wetlands credit sales program developed to support 
the federal wetlands permit program. Then, we explain how the regulatory rules governing the overall 
permit program, as well as specific rules governing credit sales, have prevented the development of robust 
markets in credit buying and selling. Based on this review, we identify an alternative institutional 
structure that would apply marketlike principles to expand the quantity of and lower the prices of credits 
while ensuring that wetlands credit sales help move the nation toward its goal: no net loss of wetlands 
acres and functions. 
Key Words: wetlands mitigation, wetlands banking, environmental markets, Clean Water Act 
JEL Classification Number: Q20 
 Contents 
1. Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Wetlands Credit Sales: Origins and Current Status....................................................... 4 
2.1. Compensation Wetlands and the CWA Section 404 Permit Program......................... 4 
2.2. Rise of Off-Site Consolidated Mitigation Options...................................................... 7 
2.3. Emergence of Private Credit Sellers............................................................................ 8 
3. Private Credit Sales in Their Regulatory Context......................................................... 10 
3.1. Regulatory Barriers to Private Credit Offset Supply................................................. 10 
3.2. ILF and Other Programs Reemerge........................................................................... 16 
4. A Proposed Approach to Securing Adequate Wetlands Credits.................................. 18 
4.1. Credit Resale Program: An Overview....................................................................... 19 
4.2. Defining Credits: The Need for a Watershed Approach............................................ 21 
4.3. The North Carolina Experience: Lessons for a Credit Resale Program.................... 25 
5. Conclusions........................................................................................................................ 30 
References.............................................................................................................................. 33 
 
 Past, Present, and Future of Wetlands Credit Sales 
Leonard Shabman and Paul Scodari* 
1. Introduction 
Wetlands are natural capital assets that may provide various ecological functions of 
benefit to people and wildlife, including hydrologic (flood and drought remediation), water 
quality (sediment and nutrient assimilation), and wildlife habitat (nursery and feeding areas).1 
Analyses conducted during the 1970s found that about 50% of the United States’ original 
wetlands had been converted to agricultural and urban land uses, making wetlands loss a matter 
of policy concern (OTA, 1984; Dahl, 1990; Dahl, 2000). This concern led to a national 
commitment to a goal of no overall net loss (NNL) of wetlands acres and functions, to be 
followed by a net gain.2 
The NNL goal became a focal point for structuring the nation’s principal regulatory 
program governing wetlands alterations. The federal permit program created by Section 404 of 
the Clean Water Act (CWA) is administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) with 
                                                 
* Shabman (shabman@rff.org) is a resident scholar at Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. Scodari is a senior 
economist, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, Alexandria, VA. The views expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutes and agencies with which they are affiliated. 
Financial support for this work was provided in part by the Resources for the Future Fellowship in Environmental 
Regulatory Implementation. The assistance of Robert Brumbaugh, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for 
Water Resources, is especially acknowledged. 
1 Wetlands ecosystems are characterized by recurrent shallow inundation or saturation at or near the surface of the 
soil and, based on the hydrologic regime and vegetative cover, can be categorized into wetlands types such as 
forested, shrub–scrub, and bogs (Cowardin et al., 1979; NRC, 1995). The specific types and levels of ecological 
functions provided by any particular wetlands parcel depend on the wetlands type and its location in the landscape 
(Mitch and Gosselink, 2000; NRC, 2001). 
2 In 1987 the Conservation Foundation convened the National Wetlands Policy Forum, which included 
representatives from environmental organizations, business, government, and academia. Their report recommended 
an interim national goal of no net loss (NNL) of wetlands acres and functions, followed by a net gain (Conservation 
Foundation, 1988). In 1990 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service interpreted the NNL goal to mean “wetland losses 
must be offset by wetland gains in terms of actual acreage and, to the extent possible, ecosystem function” (FWS, 
1990). Since 1990 the federal regulatory program has sought to support NNL of wetlands programwide. However, 
this policy goal has never been codified in law or regulation, nor has it always been clearly defined or articulated by 
the Corps. Nonetheless, the practical effect of the policy debate over NNL is that it has been widely perceived as a 
standard to be met for the program as a whole, if not necessarily for each permit.  
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oversight by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Strand, 1995; GAO, 1991).3 In 
addition, individual states have wetlands-permitting authorities that either complement or expand 
upon the federal program and also seek to support NNL as a program goal (Zinn and Copeland, 
2001). Under Section 404, anyone wishing to place fill material in an area that is delineated as 
wetlands and that falls under the legal jurisdiction of Section 404 is required to secure a permit 
from the Corps.4 If a permit is issued, the permittee has the legal and financial responsibility to 
restore degraded wetlands not affected by the permitted fill or create new wetlands from 
uplands.5 The expectation is that these “compensation wetlands” will offset the permitted loss of 
wetlands area and functions and will so support the NNL goal. These compensation wetlands are 
often called wetlands credits. The credits are defined in terms of acres of a wetlands type (e.g., 
vegetation type and appropriate hydrologic regime), in terms of metrics derived from a 
functional assessment process that seeks to measure increased ecological function resulting from 
a wetlands restoration or creation project, or both (Corps, 2002; EPA, March 2004). 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that the federal permit program directly affects only a relatively small amount of the nation’s 
total wetlands acreage. For example, in the years between 1992 and 2003, federal permittees were authorized to fill a 
total of 237,000 wetlands acres, representing only about 2.5% of the nation’s (excluding Alaska) existing stock of 
approximately 100 million acres (Source: The Quarterly Permit Data System, which is used by Corps Headquarters 
to roll up data from the Regulatory Analysis and Management System and other automated information systems that 
are used by Corps districts to record data on permit applications as they are received and processed.). As a result, 
there is a much richer mix of wetlands policies than just the federal permit program. For example, U.S. agricultural 
policy includes a provision that denies farm operators access to price and income support programs if they drain or 
fill a wetlands on their property. Also, the Wetlands Reserve Program purchases perpetual easements from farmers 
who agree to stop farming former wetlands areas and return the areas to wetlands status (Heimlich et al., 2000). In 
April 2004, President George W. Bush endorsed a policy to increase the nation’s wetlands acreage, largely through 
incentive payments to encourage wetlands restoration by private landowners.  
4 Much that remains under debate is embedded in this apparently simple sentence. Section 404 does not use the term 
wetlands, instead referring to “waters of the United States.” However, court rulings have established that waters of 
the United States included “wetlands,” as that term came to be understood after passage of the Clean Water Act in 
1972. These rulings led to other questions, such as “what are wetlands?” and “which wetlands can the Corps 
regulate?” Agreement on a wetlands definition took over 15 years to achieve and required a National Academy of 
Sciences panel report (NRC, 1995). However, the popular image of wetlands is a place with visible water at the 
surface of the land. This image conflicts with a scientific definition in which wetlands may be places where water 
rarely reaches the surface. This conflict between the general image of a wetlands and the NRC definition remains a 
source of public contention about the scope of the permitting program. Meanwhile, the scope of wetlands subject to 
Section 404 regulatory jurisdiction remains in dispute. As recently as 2001, a decision by the United States Supreme 
Court limited the federal permitting jurisdiction over so-called isolated wetlands in a specific permitting case (NRC, 
2001), and the programwide implications of that ruling continue to be debated. A related ambiguity affecting 
Section 404 implementation is the definition of fill. Recall that Section 404 only regulates the placing of fill material 
in waters of the United States (NRC, 2001). 
5 Recent reviews have argued that restoration of degraded wetlands—for example, by re-flooding former wetlands 
that had been drained for farmland—is strongly preferable to creating wetlands from uplands (NRC, 2001).  
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For the most part, the production of credits required to offset a permitted fill has been the 
responsibility of the permit recipient (permittee). However, for reasons described below, some 
permittees did not provide either the quantity or quality of credits necessary to offset their 
development impacts on wetlands area and functions, especially habitat functions. To address 
this problem, wetlands program administrators at first cautiously allowed, then later actively 
encouraged, private entrepreneurs to make investments in producing wetlands credits to be sold 
to permittees in need of compensation wetlands. Regulatory program administrators would 
certify the ecological quality of credits produced by private entrepreneurs before they could be 
sold for mitigation. Then, the same regulators would assess the wetlands acres and functions lost 
when they issued a fill permit and might allow permittees to purchase credits from certified 
credit sellers to offset the wetlands loss. In this way, credit sales would help the permit program 
to support the NNL goal. 
In conceiving this program, private credit sellers were expected to comply with credit 
quality assurance requirements when seeking regulatory certification as a credit seller. They 
would then compete on a price basis when offering credits to permittees. With the minimum 
acceptable credit quality assured, credit price would fall toward the long-run average cost of 
production. If the sellers were private entrepreneurs, then the full cost of credits supplied would 
be included in the credit price, including the opportunity cost of invested capital and returns to 
management. In principle, competition among credit sellers would drive credit prices toward 
minimum cost, but there would be no cost subsidy to recipients of fill permits. (For an early 
paper6 that makes these arguments, see Shabman, Scodari, and King, 1994.) 
The production and sale of wetlands credits has been cited as an example of a marketlike 
approach to environmental management (EPA, 2001; NAPA, 2000). However, it is more correct 
to characterize the credit sales program as analogous to the offset requirements developed in the 
other pollution control programs. Such offset programs require the regulated pollution source to 
first adopt all reasonable measures to control its own discharges, then to assure that some other 
pollution source will reduce its discharges by an amount equivalent to offset the regulated 
source’s remaining discharges.7 Similarly, in the wetlands permitting program, the regulator 
requires the permit applicant to take all practicable steps to avoid and minimize fill, and only 
then are credit offsets required for any remaining wetlands impacts. 
                                                 
6 Subsequent experience, described in this paper, suggests that these expected results were not realized.  
7 For a discussion of the differences between marketlike programs and offsets, see Shabman, Stephenson, and 
Shobe, 2002. 
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In the wetlands application, the goal of the credit sales program has been to improve the 
availability and quality of compensation wetlands. In many areas of the country, the private 
sector has provided credits to permittees in need of compensation wetlands. However, the early 
hope for significant numbers of credits sellers competing through price has not generally been 
realized. Regulatory conditions have created barriers to market entry and have created thin 
markets characterized by limited price competition. Today, private credit sellers provide only a 
small fraction of the total wetlands offsets required by regulators, and credit prices generally 
appear to be well above credit production costs. 
In this paper we first review the evolution of the credit sales program developed to 
support the federal wetlands permit program, then explain how the regulatory rules governing the 
overall permit program, as well as specific rules governing credit production and sales, have 
prevented the development of robust markets in credit buying and selling. Based on this review, 
we identify and describe an alternative institutional structure that would apply marketlike 
principles to expand the quantity of and lower the prices of credits while assuring that wetlands 
credit sales helps move the nation toward the NNL goal.8 
2. Wetlands Credit Sales: Origins and Current Status 
2.1. Compensation Wetlands and the CWA Section 404 Permit Program9 
Section 404 regulations expect Corps regulators to conduct a review, called mitigation 
sequencing, before a fill permit is issued. In this review the regulator determines whether the 
proposed activity has avoided existing wetlands to the maximum extent practicable. If avoidance 
is not deemed possible, then wetland fill must be minimized. If the regulator determines that the 
                                                 
8 Many of the observations and conclusions in this paper are drawn from the authors’ collective decades-long 
experience in the development of national wetlands mitigation policy. Citation of particular source material for 
many of the observations found in this paper would not be possible. At different times, one or both of the authors 
have completed detailed analysis of varying aspects of the wetlands permit program. We have at other times 
participated in the design of the rules governing the wetlands program in general and the credit sales program in 
particular. We have benefited from extensive interviews with regulators, permittees, and mitigation providers over 
the years and for the development of this analysis. We have also benefited from attending numerous wetlands 
conferences; reading and participating in congressional hearings; and reviewing the professional literature, agency 
memos, and articles in the popular press. As a test of the validity of the overall story told in this paper, a draft was 
reviewed by several people who were active in the development of the programs described here.  
9 Generalizations about the federal permit program are possible, even though administration of the program differs 
among the regional offices of the Corps. Also, some states have permit programs that affect the execution of the 
federal program, whereas other states have no such programs.  
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proposed development project is in the public interest but that wetlands losses will be 
unavoidable, the permittee may be required to provide wetlands credits to offset the permitted 
loss. It is worth noting that each of the two main types of permits—individual and general—has 
its own mitigation expectations and procedures for applying the sequencing logic. At present an 
individual permit is required for a wide range of activities (such as roads, dams, and residential 
and commercial development) for wetlands fills of multiple acres as well as fills as small as one-
third of an acre. But this was not always the case. For example, before 1996 wetlands fills as 
large as 10 acres and many types of development activities were exempted from individual 
permit review.10 
Corps regulators are directed by a 1990 memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the 
U.S. Department of the Army and EPA to give first preference for credit offsets that are similar 
to the wetlands types lost to the permit; it is referred to as in-kind mitigation. In addition, the 
MOA stated a regulatory preference for credits to be located as close as possible to the permitted 
fill; it referred to as on-site mitigation.11 The preference for in-kind mitigation can be interpreted 
as an effort to use wetlands type (forested, scrub, and so on) as a proxy for ensuring the 
replacement of habitat functions and values lost to permitted fills. The preference for on-site 
mitigation reflects a recognition that the values of hydrologic and water-quality functions are 
largely dependent on watershed location. For example, existing floodwater storage and water-
quality functions may benefit people living in areas downstream of the wetlands permitted for 
fill. If the wetlands credits are located at a distance from the area filled, these functions might be 
moved to a location that does not benefit the same downstream areas. Typically, permittees 
contract with wetlands consultants to plan and construct on-site and in-kind mitigation, but 
permittees retain legal responsibility for project implementation and success. 
As the regulatory program matured, critical reviews consistently found that on-site 
compensatory mitigation was not securing NNL for all wetlands functions.12 Based on the 
                                                 
10 A full discussion of the different types of Section 404 permits and their requirements is beyond the scope of this 
paper; see Strand (1995) and Corps (2002) for details. 
11 On-site mitigation is formally defined as compensation actions undertaken “in areas adjacent or contiguous to the 
discharge site” (Memorandum of Agreement between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of 
the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation under the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 
February 6, 1990). 
12 NRC (2001) concluded that compensation requirements are sometimes not implemented and often are not 
ecologically successful compared with reference sites. However, ecological success is typically based on 
comparison of replacement wetlands with ideal reference wetlands at full functional capacity, not the wetlands 
permitted for fill. In few instances is information available on the quality of the wetlands permitted for fill, which 
represents the appropriate baseline for comparison. For an exception, see Minkin and Ladd (2003).  
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identified institutional and ecological reasons for on-site mitigation failure, several arguments 
were made13 for increased use of off-site mitigation, that is, mitigation projects located away 
from the site of the permitted fill. 
 First, in some instances the required on-site mitigation credits may not have been 
provided at all, largely because of limited agency resources available for enforcement of the 
hundreds of individual mitigation projects required by permits issued each year. It suggested that 
enforcement might be more effective if multiple and spatially dispersed mitigation projects were 
consolidated in a much fewer number of larger and more easily monitored off-site areas of 
compensation wetlands. 
Second, at times the permittees supplied credits when they or their consultants had little 
knowledge of—or ability to apply—proven wetlands credit production methods.14 Sometimes 
the resulting credits were in the form of open-water ponds (a type of wetlands) that provided 
hydrologic and water-quality functions (NRC, 2001) but did not replace lost habitat functions. 
Also, if compensation wetlands were located near the permitted fill, the habitat functions of these 
credit offsets would often be compromised by polluted runoff and adverse changes in hydrologic 
regimes from surrounding development. The compensation wetlands would effectively become 
storm-water ponds that provide hydrologic and water-quality functions but not habitat functions. 
For habitat functions to be successfully replaced, compensation wetlands must be located within 
favorable landscape settings, and these locations were likely to be at some distance from 
permitted fills (NRC, 2001). 
Third, even when projects were initiated using sound mitigation practices, there was a lag 
time of several years between the time of the permitted fill activity and maturation of the 
mitigation wetlands, resulting in a temporal loss of habitat functions (King, Bohlen, and Adler, 
1993). It was argued that advanced investment at a consolidated, off-site mitigation area—even 
without certain knowledge of the location of future fill permits—could address this temporal loss 
of habitat functions. 
Finally, in some cases the regulatory program did not require credits as a permit 
condition for small fills usually authorized under general permits. Often it was deemed 
impractical to require compensation wetlands on parcels of limited size or by fill permittees with 
                                                 
13 For example, Salveson (1994) argued for off-site mitigation early on.  
14 Credit production is technically challenging but can be feasible if proper planning (including site selection) and 
construction methods are used (NRC, 2001).  
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limited financial means. Without credits being required to offset the acres and functions lost to 
these permitted fills, NNL would be compromised. 
2.2. Rise of Off-Site Consolidated Mitigation Options 
By the 1990s many observers of the wetlands permitting program agreed that there was 
too much on-site credit production with inadequate assurance that these credit offsets would 
adequately replace habitat functions lost to permitted fills. The desire to secure habitat functions 
and assure that credits were available at the time fills are permitted, combined with a desire to 
improve regulatory oversight of wetlands credit production, lent support to the concept of single-
user mitigation banking.15 A single-user mitigation bank is created when a single entity (such as 
a state highway department) creates a large and readily monitored wetlands-restoration or -
creation project away from the areas for which it expects to receive multiple fill permits. After 
the compensation wetlands are constructed and certified as trending toward ecological success, 
this entity is awarded credits that can be used to offset its own future permitted fills. These off-
site consolidated mitigation offsets represent a “deposit” of credits, and the deposit is drawn 
down as wetland fills requiring mitigation are permitted. 
Clearly, the single-user mitigation bank alternative can work only for permittees who 
expect to have a number of future development projects requiring fill permits and compensation 
wetlands and who have access to the initial capital to make the investment in advance credit 
production. Recognizing that credit offsets needed to be more widely available for permittees 
with only limited offset requirements, some local government agencies began charging a 
mitigation fee, in lieu of on-site compensation, as a condition of issuing a permit.16 These in-lieu 
fees (ILFs) were supposed to be accumulated and used to produce one or more large wetlands-
restoration or -creation projects, designed and constructed as a responsibility of a designated 
public agency. ILF programs were promoted as a means for securing compensation for even the 
smallest permitted fills. However, ILF programs have been faulted for excessive lag times before 
credit production is initiated and for not charging fees that covered the full cost of those 
compensation wetlands projects (Scodari and Shabman, 2001; Gardner, 2000; GAO, 2001). If 
fees were set below full production costs, then fewer credits than required for NNL would be 
                                                 
15 Single-user mitigation banks first came into use in the early 1980s. For a discussion of the early history of 
mitigation banking, see Brumbaugh and Reppert (1994).  
16 In some cases, state or local government agencies secured government funds to establish mitigation banks for 
general use. Largely due to the difficulty in securing public funds to capitalize banks, few of these public ventures 
were created (Scodari and Brumbaugh, 1996).  
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produced, or public funds would be needed to complete the projects. In effect, a failure to 
properly account for costs was working against NNL, or, if public funds were used, there was an 
implicit public subsidy to permittees. By the mid-1990s, interest in ILF programs waned as the 
interest in promoting private credit sales grew. For reasons outlined later in this paper, interest in 
ILF programs was renewed in the late 1990s. 
2.3. Emergence of Private Credit Sellers 
Perhaps the most important result of the early ILF programs was the precedent they 
established for the transfer of legal and financial responsibility for providing wetlands  
offsets from permittees to another party—an ILF program administrator—in return for cash 
payment.17 It was the affirmation by regulatory authorities that they would allow this transfer of 
responsibility for providing offsets that motivated private investors to produce credits for 
commercial sale.18 In turn, the federal government issued mitigation banking guidance in  
1995 to encourage the private sector to make such investments.19 By specifying requirements  
for certification as a credit seller, the guidance sought to reduce uncertainty that investors  
might face when assessing the financial viability of entering this business and to reassure 
skeptics of the ecological value of private-sector off-site credit production (Scodari, Shabman, 
and White, 1995). 
Today, entrepreneurs with access to private-sector capital (borrowing or internal firm 
equity) have acquired land in areas away from intensive development and made investments in 
producing wetlands credits for sale to future permittees.20 These sellers and their credits are 
subject to certification before credit sales can be used as offsets for permitted fills. Certification 
requires that either ecological success criteria for credits are met or, if not yet met, financial 
                                                 
17 Prior to the development of the credit sales program, the Fina Oil Company developed a mitigation bank in 
coastal Louisiana for use as compensation for its own future permitted fills. After the bank was developed, the 
company determined that it had no prospective use for some of the credits it had created and proposed selling them 
to other companies who needed credits. At the time this concept was untested, and the effort to set regulatory rules 
to govern this credit sale contributed, along with the emergence of the ILF programs, to the development of the 
private credit sales program (Scodari, Shabman, and White, 1995).  
18 These private credit sales ventures are commonly referred to as private commercial (or entrepreneurial) mitigation 
banks.  
19 Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks; Notice. Federal Register 
60(228): 58605, Nov. 28, 1995.  
20 For a recent national survey of private credit sales ventures, see ELI (2002). 
8 Resources for the Future  Shabman and Scodari 
 
assurances (e.g., performance bonds) are provided.21 Monitoring of the status of the credits is the 
responsibility of the credit seller, and the regulatory authority can exercise random audits and 
inspections of the compensation wetlands project. In addition, conservation easements, deed 
restrictions, and transfers to public ownership are expected to ensure that compensation wetlands 
retain their wetlands status in perpetuity. In some cases, an endowment fund under the control of a 
resource agency or nonprofit conservation group with interest dedicated to perpetual management 
must be established. 
For wetlands regulators, the credits provided by private investors promise to be 
successful relative to traditional on-site credits provided by permittees.22 The access to private 
capital makes funds available to initiate credit production in advance of fill impacts. Strict rules 
for quality control that must be met for the seller to be certified to produce and sell credits, 
combined with the serious attention to cost accounting and pricing in the private sector, were 
expected to result in credit prices that reflected the full costs of ecologically successful credit 
production. Private credit sellers would have the flexibility to locate mitigation sites in areas that 
favor long-term ecological success, and monitoring and enforcement of relatively fewer mitigation 
projects and responsible parties would be more readily accomplished. Also, the ready availability of 
credits for sale would reduce the chance that regulators might not require compensation wetlands 
for relatively minor fills in which on-site mitigation (or other permit-specific mitigation) was not 
feasible. 
                                                 
21 In the event of credit failure, money from the financial assurance would be used to pay for the redevelopment of 
the promised wetland credits. The financial assurance amounts are set so that any monies collected as a result of default 
on private-sector obligations would be sufficient for repairing the failed site. In addition to providing indemnification for 
regulators, financial assurances can facilitate ecological success of compensation wetlands by providing economic 
incentives for the credit seller to fulfill its credit production obligations, and to do so in a timely manner, because 
assurance monies could not be released until these obligations were fulfilled. The use of financial assurances 
recognizes that the profitability of an investment in credit sales requires the opportunity to sell some portion of 
credit capacity prior to achievement of specified ecological success criteria. Once credit performance has been 
established, the financial assurance monies are returned (Corps, 1995). 
22 The assertion that private sellers are offering credits of higher quality cannot be documented by available data. 
Currently, only limited monitoring tracks wetlands-permitting and -mitigation activities (NRC, 2001; Corps, 2001; 
Corps, 2002). Furthermore, no case studies of mitigation credit provision compare credits provided by permittees 
with those provided by credit sellers. What can be compared are the legal and other requirements for quality 
assurance imposed on permittees versus commercial credit sellers. Few of the quality assurance requirements 
described for the private sellers apply to permittees who do their own mitigation. On this basis many observers 
believe that private-sector credit production yields greater assurance of ecological success (NRC, 2001). 
Nevertheless, some of these agencies, as well as many environmental advocacy groups, remain skeptical of private 
enterprise as a reliable provider of wetlands credits (Corps, 2001a; Sibbing, 2003). More specifically, some critics 
argue that private credit sellers tend to seek out lower cost land and, in so doing, may provide quality credits but in 
remote locations that do not replace functions lost in the watershed where the fill permit was issued (see, for 
example, Salzman and Ruhl, 2004). This location argument is addressed in more detail later in this paper.  
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At the same time, fill permit applicants and private credit suppliers have been enthusiastic 
about the potential advantages of the credit sales program. Permittees are relieved of the need to 
dedicate land at their development sites to compensation wetlands, and uncertainty about the cost 
of mitigation is eliminated. Wetlands consultants who help permit applicants to navigate the 
permit process and land developers with experience as permit applicants in that process have 
recognized the profit potential of adding consolidated credit production to their business models. 
In fact, the number of private credit sales ventures has expanded across the nation 
(Environmental Law Institute, 2002; Scodari and Brumbaugh, 1996). The sellers have formed a 
professional business association, have their own annual conference, and have association 
activities that promote the business (see http://www.mitigationbanking.org). Nevertheless, 
private credit sales now account for a relatively small fraction of the compensation wetlands 
produced and used to meet mitigation requirements. 
3. Private Credit Sales in Their Regulatory Context 
Private credit sales for permitted wetlands impacts were promoted as a way to help to 
advance the NNL goal. However, private credit sales still constitute only a small fraction of the 
total mitigation required by regulators. Today, private credit sellers provide no more than 10– 
20% of the total wetlands credits required by fill permits in any region of the country, and in 
many regions the proportion is much less.23 Several factors—many under the control of 
regulatory authorities—appear to limit private-sector investment in credit production. Factors 
that impede private credit investment and sales, as well as the basis for and implications of 
lingering concerns over this wetlands mitigation option, are reviewed below. 
3.1. Regulatory Barriers to Private Credit Offset Supply 
Private credit sellers, in seeking a competitive return on invested capital, must have sales 
revenue sufficient to recover all costs of production. Costs include cash outlays for all purchased 
inputs; the opportunity cost of invested funds; the opportunity cost of owned assets, land, and 
labor; charges for management time; and a return to investment risk. However, rules governing 
the credit sales program may raise the cost of supplying credits beyond what is necessary to 
secure ecological success. Meanwhile, uncertainties about the scope of the wetlands permitting 
program, the continuing opportunity for permittees to provide mitigation on-site, and the 
                                                 
23 This estimate is based on interviews with staff at a number of the Corps field offices and policy analysts at the 
Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources.  
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presence of alternative forms of off-site mitigation (such as ILF payments) make the expected 
future demand for credits highly uncertain. These supply- and demand-side factors limit the 
expansion of private credit investment and sales in several ways. 
First, consider how regulatory approval procedures affect the costs of private credit 
supply. An intense scrutiny of the credit certification and sales plan of the seller by an 
interagency mitigation banking review team (MBRT) has raised the administrative costs of 
gaining approval to produce and sell credits.24 The MBRT process for gaining approval as a 
credit seller may take several years to complete and requires extensive expenditures for legal 
counsel and technical consultants. Land must have been acquired or a purchase option secured. 
An intensive regulatory review of the techniques will be used to restore or create the wetlands, 
and strict performance criteria related to hydrology, soils, and vegetation are established for 
compensation wetlands. Regulators also require sellers to post performance bonds or other 
financial assurances when established performance criteria for compensation wetlands have not 
yet been fully met by the time at which they are used as the basis for credit sales. In effect, in 
seeking to assure ecological success of the wetlands credits, regulators impose significant and 
possibly redundant costs on the seller, including opportunity costs of funds invested in land 
while approval is pending, costs for the engineering design and documentation of how the 
project will be developed, and opportunity cost of the funds used to post performance bonds. 
Meanwhile, regulatory review must establish the number of credits that can eventually be sold. If 
the credits are represented as acres of a restored wetlands type, then the determination of credit 
quantity is rarely a matter of significant dispute between the prospective seller and MBRT.25 
However, where functional assessments are used to assess the level of credit production, there is 
often a protracted disagreement over how many credits will ultimately be produced. Functional 
assessment is a process that relies heavily on the professional judgment of biologists in the use of 
any particular assessment method to score and then place weights on the hydrologic, habitat, and 
                                                 
24 The 1995 mitigation banking guidance gives EPA, the Corps, and the other federal and state agencies access to 
and oversight of the MBRT process for approving a private credit seller’s production plan.  
25 If credits are based on preservation of existing wetlands, then multiple acres (10 or more) of such preserved 
wetlands typically are required as compensation for every acre of wetlands lost to permitted fills. The logic for such 
acreage requirements is that preservation does not add to the nation’s wetlands stock and so cannot offset the loss of 
wetlands acreage resulting from a permit; however, if the wetlands being preserved are deemed to be threatened by 
imminent development pressure, then the case for preservation as compensation is stronger. In many cases 
preservation is combined with a restoration requirement as part of a mitigation package for a permitted fill. In the 
Corps Norfolk District, for example, permittees commonly provide wetlands restoration or creation for every acre of 
wetlands lost to permitted fills to ensure NNL of wetlands acreage in addition to the preservation of on- or off-site 
wetlands deemed to be of high value (personal correspondence with Steve Martin, Corps, Norfolk District).  
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water-quality functions of compensation wetlands. Differences of view between and among 
biologists in the regulatory agencies and resource agencies (e.g., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) 
and the seller are common,26 and how such differences are resolved can significantly affect the 
revenue potential for the seller. 
Second, consider how uncertainty about the future demand for credits created by the 
regulatory program discourages investment in credit production. Entrepreneurs won’t make an 
investment to produce a product if they are not sure when or if they will be able to sell that 
product. Difficulty in predicting future land development patterns that affect wetlands filling—
and therefore the future demand for credits—is always present. However, greater sources of 
demand uncertainty are embedded in the regulatory program itself. First, uncertainty is created 
by the ambiguity of national wetlands regulatory policy. When Congress wrote Section 404 of 
the Clean Water Act, its intent was unclear. As a result of the ambiguity of legislative intent, 
there has been persistent policy disagreement over matters as basic as what constitutes wetlands, 
what constitutes fill, what constitutes “waters of the United States” for defining the limits of 
federal jurisdiction, what constitutes an activity significant enough to warrant intensive 
regulatory review, and what constitutes appropriate mitigation for a permitted fill. In the absence 
of legislative clarification, the goals and structure of the permitting program have been defined 
by executive orders, administrative rulemaking, and rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court and 
lower courts (Zinn and Copeland, 2001; Strand, 1997; NRC, 1995; NRC, 2001). It is reasonable 
to assume that the federal wetlands regulatory program will continue to be reshaped in these 
various ways, and the attendant uncertainty about how the program may change in the future 
could make investment in credit production a high-risk activity. For example, if prospective 
private sales ventures believe that future regulatory requirements may not require credits for 
permitted fill or may limit the wetlands areas or wetlands types for which credits will be 
required, then they will discount the possibility of making credit sales in future years.27 
The sequencing process that governs the fill permit review also contributes to credit 
demand uncertainty. Recall that the sequencing process requires permit applicants to first avoid 
                                                 
26 For evidence on this in Florida, see Corps (2001a). 
27 A recent newspaper article that includes the perspectives of several private credit sellers on the effects of shifting 
interpretations of regulatory jurisdiction on credit investment and sales illustrates this point. One credit seller that 
has multiple credit ventures in the Chicago area and elsewhere is quoted as saying that his firm’s revenue in 2001 
was only 8% of what it was in 2000 as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 2001 that limits regulatory 
jurisdiction over isolated intrastate waters. In that same article, a former president of the National Association of 
Mitigation Bankers notes that “because of the obstacles, some companies have left the industry or moved away from 
mitigation banking and now are focusing on consulting work” (Meyer, 2004).  
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and minimize wetland impacts as a condition for permit issuance. Then if a permit is to be 
issued, the regulator will first examine and give preference to available opportunities for the 
permittee to provide on-site mitigation for permitted wetland impacts (even though, as noted 
earlier, regulators have been increasingly concerned about the quality of on-site mitigation). 
However, no standard analytical protocol is followed in applying the sequencing steps, giving 
the person reviewing the permit application wide latitude in the process. Thus, the regulator’s 
judgment determines whether the proposed activity is water dependent, whether the wetlands can 
be avoided, whether compensation wetlands should be provided to offset permitted impacts, and 
whether on-site mitigation is practicable; such judgments can be highly variable among Corps 
regulators. Then, if the regulator does allow the permittee to seek credits off site, then the kind 
and location of wetlands credits that will be required is determined for that permit and may not 
be at the location or for the type of wetlands that have been created by a credit seller in the same 
general area. So even if a permittee wants to use a specific credit seller (having come to 
agreement with that seller on credit price), there is no guarantee that the Corps regulator will 
decide that the proposed credit trade can be used to satisfy the permittee’s mitigation 
requirement. 
Finally, the regulatory (MBRT) approval procedures for credit sellers also circumscribe a 
seller’s potential credit demand by limiting the geographic scope of permit impacts for which the 
seller’s credits could potentially be used as compensation wetlands. Recall that wetlands, as a 
natural capital asset, may provide hydrologic, water-quality, and habitat functions depending on 
the wetlands type and its location. Also recall that the values from the hydrologic and water-
quality functions of existing wetlands are largely dependent on watershed location; therefore, 
credits to compensate for these functions should typically be near permitted fills. Habitat 
functions are less site dependent and in fact often might even be enhanced if compensation 
wetlands were moved away from a developing area (e.g., to adjoin a nature preserve). Requiring 
that the credits be at or near the location of permitted fills best replaces hydrologic and water-
quality functions and values, but habitat functions and values may best be replaced at more 
distant locations. Because the wetlands-permitting program has been organized around the 
wetlands asset, and not the three sets of ecological functions, there has had to be a compromise 
on location of the wetlands credits to balance functional trade-offs inherent in the choice of 
mitigation location. The compromise has been to limit the area in which wetlands credits can be 
sold, referred to as the service area (or sales area). In many cases service areas have been 
limited to spatially small watersheds, with the effects of both restricting the potential demand for 
credits for a private seller and limiting the ability of multiple sellers to compete for credit sales. 
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Despite the high regulatory approval costs for credit sellers and significant credit demand 
uncertainty, private-sector investment in credit production has occurred in many areas of the 
country since the mid-1990s. What explains this seeming contradiction? More specifically, how 
were the significant market entry costs and demand uncertainty risks successfully managed by 
these market entrants? Some evidence points toward a plausible risk management process 
(Shabman, Stephenson, and Scodari, 1998). First, before seeking approval as a credit seller, 
prospective sellers identify prospective applicants for fill permits at specific sites. A prospective 
permit applicant and credit seller might then reach an informal understanding with the regulatory 
agency or conclude, based on previous regulatory decisions, that the permit applicant will be 
allowed to meet its mitigation requirement by purchasing credits from that particular seller, if the 
seller’s credits are certified. Included in this understanding is the kind of credits that will be required 
to compensate for wetland losses at the fill site and the acceptable location for credits (i.e., the 
service area and in-kind requirements).28 Second, regulatory approval of a credit seller typically 
allows a limited share of the produced credits to be sold before mitigation wetlands have been 
certified fully successful in accordance with established performance criteria, in return for the 
posting of a financial assurance. With these two considerations in mind, the credit seller and the 
permit applicant could negotiate a credit price that was high enough for the seller to recover a 
significant share of its costs for the whole credit venture, even if only a fraction of the credits 
produced (those required by the pending fill permit) were eventually sold.29 Because there are 
few if any competing sellers, the credit prices paid were based on the permit applicant’s avoided 
cost from buying credits, rather than different sellers’ cost of production (including a competitive 
return on invested capital). The fill permit applicant’s avoided cost includes expenditures for 
producing and maintaining on-site credits, opportunity costs of dedicating part of the 
                                                 
28 It may be more accurate to say that these understandings are a result of the tacit knowledge of credit sellers about 
the demand for fill permits and the likely compensation requirements of the regulators. Credit sellers are closely 
linked to the wetlands consulting and land development sectors that track local development trends and that have 
experience with the permit application process. This is how the seller can anticipate a demand for wetlands credits 
and be expert in navigating the often confusing regulatory process, both in securing permits for fill and in getting 
their credits approved for sale. Meanwhile, as credit sales have become more common, communication among 
sellers and regulators has increased, such as at the sellers’ annual meeting. Presentations at these conferences as well 
as informal discussions allow credit sellers to infer what will be required to secure approval as a credit seller.  
29 This risk management strategy relates mainly to private credit sellers driven by the profit motive. A recent 
national survey of private credit sellers asked about their primary objectives in credit investment (Bailey et al., 
2004). It found that while profit was by far the most often identified primary objective, a significant share of 
surveyed private sellers said that they were primarily motivated to improve and conserve lands they owned. Credit 
sellers motivated by the latter legacy objective thus face different opportunity costs and incentives than profit-
motivated sellers, and they may be more willing to invest in credit production in the absence of immediate prospects 
for credit sales.  
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development site to mitigation, and legal or administrative costs for securing the fill permit. This 
last cost item is avoided (or reduced) because the credit seller often includes permitting 
assistance as a part of the credit price. 
This market entry and credit pricing strategy served all concerned parties. Permit 
applicants who purchased credits benefited for the reasons noted above. The intensive MBRT 
review required for regulatory approval of credit sellers, combined with requirements for financial 
assurances and long-term protection and maintenance of compensation wetlands, provides 
assurance to the regulatory agency that the credits produced will be ecologically successful. 
Meanwhile, the private seller earns an acceptable return on its entire investment in the credit venture 
from the immediate sale of just a portion of its credit supply. Hence, past and future costs are 
covered, and the potential problem of future demand uncertainty is effectively addressed (Shabman, 
Stephenson, and Scodari, 1998). Investment in credit production in anticipation of making future 
sales is a high-cost with high-risk business, and the wetlands regulatory program creates the risk. 
The market entry and credit pricing strategy of credit sellers outlined above minimizes the 
financial risk of uncertain future credit sales. Note that this strategy requires entrepreneurial and 
business management skills as much as wetlands restoration expertise. As a result, the wetlands 
credit sales business attracted sellers with certain characteristics conducive to participating in this 
market. The sellers have access to capital markets for borrowing. They often already own tracts 
of land in locations and in conditions suited to wetlands credit production or have business 
contacts with the owners of such lands. Sellers are also expert in navigating the often confusing 
regulatory process both in securing permits for fill and in getting their credits approved for sale. 
The credit price charged is a return to this risk and project management skill as well as for the land, 
labor, capital, and know-how used for credit production. 
Although the risk management strategy described above has helped private entrepreneurs 
in many areas to effectively overcome barriers to credit investment and sales embedded in the 
wetlands permitting program, those barriers nevertheless have limited widespread market entry 
and thus credit sales competition. In most areas where private investment in credit production 
has occurred, only one or a few private sellers are present, and the credits they have been 
certified to sell are generally limited to small sales areas. Moreover, in places where private 
sellers are present, they have to set credit prices to recover not only the costs of credit production 
but also the regulatory costs of gaining credit sales approval and the risk costs associated with 
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future demand uncertainty (Shabman, Stephenson, and Scodari, 1998). As a result, credit prices 
may exceed what many permit applicants are able to pay for wetlands mitigation.30 
3.2. ILF and Other Programs Reemerge 
Given high prices and limited availability of private seller credits, permit-specific, on-site 
mitigation remained a necessary option for permittees and regulators. Hence, the problems of 
compensatory mitigation failure from permittee-sponsored mitigation, especially for habitat 
functions, and the failure to even require compensation for wetland functions lost by some fills, 
continued to be concerns (NRC, 2001; http://www.mitigationactionplan.gov/). The result was a 
renewed interest in ILF programs and similar off-site mitigation options beginning in the later 
half of the 1990s (Environmental Law Institute, 2002; Scodari and Shabman, 2000).31 Recall that 
in ILF mitigation, after a permit application has undergone the sequencing review and the 
                                                 
30 These general conclusions hold for most areas of country, including areas where private credit investment has 
been relatively significant. To date, much of the total national investment in private credit supply has been 
concentrated in areas where fill permitting and thus mitigation needs are relatively high. These areas include Florida, 
Louisiana, California, Virginia, and the Chicago region (ELI, 2002). However, specific outcomes in different areas 
have been largely shaped by area-specific factors, which in some areas have exacerbated the barriers to credit sales 
inherent in the federal program and in other areas have mitigated against federal barriers. In Florida, for example, 
where state policies have encouraged private credit investment and sales since 1994, both supply- and demand-side 
barriers to credit investment are evident. While supply-side barriers relate primarily to a lengthy and often 
contentious MBRT approval process for credit ventures, demand-side barriers can be traced to state policies that 
allow for various types of competing ILF programs and that serve to limit private credit demand in various other 
ways. Nevertheless, Florida now has roughly 30 approved private ventures, although it appears that many are having 
trouble selling credits. This apparent credit surplus may be responsible for reports of falling credit prices in some 
areas of the state in recent years. In the Chicago Corps district area, by contrast, the barriers to credit investment and 
use do not appear as great as in Florida. Currently, 17 private ventures are operating in the district, and multiple 
ventures are located in three of the five standard service areas established for the district. Nonetheless, the presence 
of multiple private ventures with coexisting service areas has apparently not resulted in downward pressure on credit 
prices, and interest in new private credit investment seems to be limited at this time. One area where credit 
investment has been greatly facilitated by state policies is Virginia. That state now has roughly 30 private credit 
ventures, with another 15 in various stages of development. Some price competition is evident in several of the 
standard service areas established in the state. Various Virginia specific factors appear to contribute to this result.  
Service areas established by state law span hundreds to thousands of square miles, a state general permitting 
authority for fills less than one-half acre encourages the use of off-site credits as compensatory mitigation, the ILF 
program pegs its fees at levels that do not undercut private-seller credit prices, and the MBRT process is widely 
acknowledged as being a minimally burdensome relative to how that process works in many other areas.  
31 During this period, Corps headquarters encouraged Corps districts to develop and use ILF systems to provide 
compensation for relatively minor wetlands impacts authorized under general permits. Indeed, the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers Proposal to Issue and Modify Nationwide Permits (Federal Register 64: 39252, 1999) stated, 
“Mitigation banks, in lieu fee programs, and other consolidated mitigation approaches will be the preferred method 
of providing compensatory mitigation, unless the District Engineer determines that activity-specific compensatory 
mitigation is more appropriate.”  
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regulator has determined that the permittee can satisfy mitigation requirements through an  
ILF program, the permittee pays a fee to an ILF administrator (typically a conservation 
organization or government resource agency designated by the Corps to receive and use fees) 
instead of implementing permit-specific compensatory mitigation. The collected fees are 
accumulated and used by the ILF administrator to plan and implement one or more wetlands 
mitigation projects. In this way a responsible third party is paid to take on the obligation to 
provide the necessary credits. 
A related motivation for the renewed interest in ILF programs was the increasing 
emphasis on taking a watershed approach to compensatory mitigation, at least to secure habitat 
functions (NRC, 2001; Mitigation Action Plan, 2002). A watershed approach means placing 
compensation wetlands in landscape settings where wetlands functions are most likely to be 
realized and prove beneficial. Many ILF programs have followed such an approach to mitigation 
location and design (Scodari and Shabman, 2000). 
Despite these apparent advantages of ILF mitigation, various reviews (Scodari and 
Shabman, 2000; Gardner, 2000; GAO, 2001) concluded that ILF programs might not provide the 
same high-quality assurances as private credit sellers, in part because the fees charged may not 
be adequate to cover the costs of credit production. Also, ILF mitigation results in a time lag 
between the fill activity and the mitigation being initiated, at least at the start of such ventures. 
Meanwhile, regulators have approved with increasing frequency various other ways of securing 
off-site compensation. For example, cash donations to ongoing restoration projects of 
nongovernmental organizations and government agencies have been accepted as credits for 
permitted fills. Also, permittees have been allowed to conduct off-site mitigation on lands owned 
by such organizations (ELI, 2002). Many of the same criticisms of ILF programs apply to these 
other off-site mitigation options. 
From the perspective of private credit sellers, on-site mitigation, ILF programs, and cash 
donation programs provide inferior compensation wetlands and unfair competition. They point 
out that these mitigation options are held to lower quality control standards, do not bear any costs 
of credit sales certification and credit demand uncertainty, and may not employ accurate cost 
accounting—including not reflecting some costs (e.g., donated land and labor) of production in 
their prices. 
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Indeed, private credit sellers have voiced concerns about all of the regulatory barriers to 
entry and the credit demand uncertainty issues outlined earlier32 and have sought to overcome 
them in part through the political process. For example, lobbying by credit sellers helped move 
regulators to issue guidance to agency field offices that impose stricter requirements on ILF 
programs and that establish a hierarchy for use of mitigation options that favors private credit 
suppliers over ILF mitigation.33 Political pressure by private sellers is also evident in recent 
federal legislation that requires the Corps to issue regulations establishing consistent 
performance standards and criteria for use of all types of compensatory mitigation.34 That law 
also authorizes U.S. Department of Defense agencies to purchase credits from private sellers as 
compensatory mitigation for agency activities that adversely impact wetlands, thus increasing 
potential credit demand. Private sellers have also lobbied for ongoing administrative efforts to 
raise the quality assurance requirements and enforcement activity applied to on-site mitigation 
projects (http://www.mitigationactionplan.gov). 
4. A Proposed Approach to Securing Adequate Wetlands Credits 
Over time, different approaches have been used to try to secure an adequate quantity and 
quality of wetlands credits. Each approach has relative strengths and weaknesses. Permittee-
responsible on-site and in-kind mitigation often replace hydrologic and water-quality functions 
lost to permitted fills but are subject to monitoring and enforcement difficulties and typically do 
not adequately replace any lost habitat functions. Single-user mitigation banks and ILF programs 
place credits in a watershed setting that can secure habitat functions but, at times, at the expense 
                                                 
32 In a recent national survey of certified credit sellers, a stratified random sample of 89 private sellers were asked to 
comment on key obstacles to credit investment and sales (Bailey et al., 2004). The most frequently cited obstacles 
(in terms of the percentage of credit sellers that identified them) included changing requirements and regulations 
(20%), bureaucracy and time required for certification (16%), lack of agency support (15%), cost of the certification 
process (8%), and competition from ILF programs (5%). Moreover, about 75% of the surveyed credit sellers 
reported that they had no plans for additional credit investments.  
33 Federal Guidance on the Use of In-Lieu-Fee Arrangements for Compensatory Mitigation under Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act and Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act; Notice. Federal Register 65(216): 66914, Nov. 7, 
2000.  
34 Sec. 2694b of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (H.R. 1588) states, “To the maximum 
extent practicable, the regulatory standards and criteria shall maximize available credits and opportunities for 
mitigation … and apply equivalent standards and criteria to each type of compensatory mitigation.” In a statement 
issued when the House passed the defense bill, Rep. Walter Jones (R-NC) commented, “This provides important 
flexibility when constructing projects. Without statutory certainty, mitigation bankers [private credit sellers] would 
have had trouble getting money from lenders, new bankers may not have entered the business, and developers would 
have been hesitant to buy credits.”(Quote reported in Inside EPA’s Water Policy Report, Jan. 12, 2004).  
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of other functions. However, the single-user bank provides credits only to developers who have 
multiple future credit needs. ILF and similar programs have been questioned based on time lags 
and accountability concerns relating to implementation and cost. Finally, although private credit 
sellers have been able to provide high-quality off-site credits, for reasons already explained, 
private sellers are located in only a few areas, and credit prices may exceed the ability to pay of 
many permittees. We believe that the best components of each approach can be combined to 
build a composite program for wetlands credit provision that could provide an adequate supply 
of quality-assured and affordable wetlands credit offsets—an approach we call a credit resale 
program.    
4.1. Credit Resale Program: An Overview  
Based on the experiences with both private credit sales and ILF programs, a new credit 
resale program could be designed to provide more affordable and high-quality credits, where 
production is initiated in advance of fill permits in many more watersheds. Furthermore, the 
program could be designed so that credit needs are defined in a watershed context to assure the 
replacement of all wetlands functions compromised by a permitted fill. In this section we discuss 
the basic structure and operation of a credit resale program. In the next section we illustrate the 
concept with a discussion of the nascent North Carolina Ecosystem Enhancement Program and 
discuss the special challenge and importance of defining functional losses resulting from any 
permitted fill and relating those losses to the establishment and implementation of credit 
requirements. 
Three interrelated elements form the foundation for the credit resale approach. First, 
funds to capitalize the program and other needed authorities would be provided to a 
nonregulatory agency with the mission of securing appropriate compensation wetlands for 
permitted fill impacts (drawing upon the logic of having an ILF administrator). Second, that 
agency would use some of the program funding to support planning efforts to predict future 
wetlands credit needs of permittees by type and location over a fixed period of time, as well as 
watershed priorities to guide the identification of general mitigation locations and designs.35 In 
executing this responsibility, the agency would secure the form and level of interagency 
collaboration needed to assure that all wetlands functions compromised by the fill permit are 
addressed. (This particular responsibility is further discussed in Section 4.2.) Third, the 
                                                 
35 As will be explored further in this section, the mitigation requirements of permittees and the location and kind of 
credits would be defined according to separate categories of wetlands functions. 
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responsible agency would be given the authority to act as both a credit purchaser and reseller of 
the purchased credits. In that role, the agency would use a competitive bidding program to secure 
an inventory of quality-certified credits to meet the projected future mitigation needs of 
permittees. The credits would be purchased from the winning bidders and sold to future fill 
permittees, and when the inventory was exhausted, a new round of bidding would be initiated. If 
properly designed and administered, this program could secure the supply, quality, and price 
advantages of a competitive market for wetlands credits (numerous credit sellers competing for 
the business of permittees) necessary for achieving the NNL goal while advancing a watershed 
approach to selecting the locations and designs of compensation wetlands. 
The process would work in the following way. The designated agency (mitigation 
agency) first estimates (for, say, 10 years) the number and type of credits it anticipates being 
required to meet the NNL goal in a defined sales area. With that estimate in hand, the mitigation 
agency issues a request for proposals (RFP) from potential suppliers of credits. The low-cost 
bidder that provides ecological success assurances, such as those now imposed on private sellers 
within the existing credit sales program, are awarded the credit supply contract.36 The price paid 
for credits by the mitigation agency reflects the full cost of producing and then maintaining 
ecologically successful credits. The RFP also includes a requirement for long-term site 
protection and maintenance.37 The winning bidder immediately begins the mitigation project, 
and payments for this work by the mitigation agency follow on a defined schedule tied to project 
construction milestones and the attainment of performance criteria (not to prospective and 
uncertain future credit sales to individual permittees, as under the current credit sales program). 
If the mitigation agency overestimated credit demand, then the RFP for the next time period 
could be delayed. If credit demand was underestimated, then the mitigation agency could 
immediately issue a new RFP. For this system to work, the mitigation agency issuing RFPs must 
have access to an initial fund that can be drawn on to pay the winning bidders on an agreed-to 
schedule. In turn, the agency must resell the acquired credits to permittees at a price that recovers 
its credit acquisition costs. The price charged for credits by the mitigation agency might be 
                                                 
36 Preferably, the quality assurances would largely be based on the posting of financial assurances that are held until 
performance goals for the mitigation wetlands (e.g., attainment of a certain hydrologic regime) are achieved. 
37 The low-cost bidder might be a government agency or a nongovernmental organization (NGO). However, the 
NGO would need to plan and initiate credit production work up front and would need to have the same quality 
assurances as all other bidders. If the NGO does not charge for some costs, such as interest on capital or on 
volunteer labor, it would have a competitive advantage over private-sector bidders. Unless NGOs are prohibited as 
bidders, this inherent advantage cannot be entirely avoided and would represent an implicit subsidy for wetlands 
filling.  
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thought of as an ILF for compensation wetlands, but this fee is based on real projects and real 
costs elicited from the bidding process. Credit fee revenues obtained from permittees then are 
used to repay the fund until another round of bidding is required. 
The core concept underlying the credit resale program outlined above is taken from the 
economics literature for managing natural monopoly and is called competition for the field 
(Demsetz, 1968). In the general case of a natural monopoly, a government body holds a 
competition where firms compete for the exclusive right to offer a product in a specified area. 
The winner of the competition would sell the product directly to the consumers and would be 
responsible for bearing and managing any demand risk. Presumably, they would include 
recognition of this risk in their bid to provide the service. For example, if a water distribution 
system were to be built, firms would compete for the right to build the system and then charge 
user fees that would recover costs. The key to this program is that the government would assure 
the winning firm that no other competing systems would be built in the area for a specified 
period of time. 
In the wetlands application, the field is the service area and the product to be produced 
and sold is wetlands credits. However, for this application there must be an accommodation of 
the demand uncertainty created by the wetlands regulatory structure. Specifically, the mitigation 
agency would purchase the credits produced by the winning bidder(s) on a defined payment 
schedule. This has the effect of shifting the credit demand risk from the private to the public 
sector and in so doing encourages credit suppliers to compete to provide a product with an 
assurance that there will be a demand for the product.38 By removing demand risk from the 
private sector, fostering competition among prospective suppliers, and eliminating some costs of 
gaining regulatory approval associated with the existing credit sales program, credit prices 
should move toward full costs of production.39 
4.2. Defining Credits: The Need for a Watershed Approach 
To be most effective, the credit resale approach must address a problem that has plagued 
wetlands mitigation generally: functional trade-offs inherent in the choice of credit location. 
                                                 
38 Recall that the public (i.e., the federal government) creates investment risk by the uncertain nature of federal 
processes for regulatory approval of credit sales ventures and credit sales and by the continuing ambiguities in the 
wetlands permit program. 
39 Preliminary simulations suggest that prices might fall as much as 75% in some places (Shabman, Stephenson, and 
Scodari, 1998). 
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Earlier it was recognized that the water-quality and hydrologic functions of a wetlands area in a 
watershed setting are largely dependent on watershed location, and if lost to a permitted fill, they 
often must be replaced on or nearby the fill site. However, the values of wetlands habitat 
functions to people and wildlife are less site dependent. And importantly, in many cases, it is not 
possible to replace lost habitat functions through on-site mitigation because the habitat functions 
of the compensation wetlands are ultimately compromised over time by surrounding 
development. Therefore, to adequately compensate for habitat functions lost to permitted fills, 
there generally is no viable alternative to off-site credit production. 
In fact, the inability to secure habitat functions through on-site compensation wetlands is 
largely why past studies of on-site mitigation projects found high rates of ecological failure and 
served as one major motivation for greater use of off-site credits. But if the wetlands credits were 
moved away from the fill location to favor habitat functions, then location-specific hydrologic 
and water-quality functions would be lost. Because mitigation requirements are being defined in 
terms of the wetlands asset (i.e., wetlands area and aggregate functions) and not its separable 
wetlands functions, there is a continuing tension over which functions to favor in regulatory 
decisions about credit location. 
In the context of the current credit sales program, this tension generally has been 
addressed by requiring mitigation projects to be located within the same (usually small) 
watershed area as the fill sites they serve. But this method of minimizing functional trade-offs 
has proved less than ideal. Despite constricted service areas and broad support for a watershed 
approach to compensatory mitigation, allowing credits to be located at some distance from the 
fill impacts they offset remains controversial (as does the acceptance of out-of-kind credits).40 
Meanwhile, limiting service areas to small watersheds has created other problems that would be 
expected to affect a credit resale program. One problem has been a thin market; in effect, there is 
often only one seller in many areas where credits are now sold. A second problem has been that 
spatially small service areas limit the land parcels suited for a wetlands mitigation project that 
can provide all wetlands functions. The owners of such parcels can recognize the unique assets 
they hold in land sale negotiations with prospective credit sellers. The result has been escalating 
prices for mitigation sites that in turn lead to high credit prices. 
                                                 
40 Salzman and Ruhl (2004), for example, argue that the effect of credit sales is to “move wetlands out of areas 
where they may provide valuable services to urban populations into sparsely populated areas where, most likely, 
their service provision is either redundant or less valuable.” As evidence, they cite studies that compared the 
geographic location of wetland impact and credit sites for a limited set of credit sales in Florida (King and Herbert, 
1997) and Virginia (Jennings et al., 1999), which concluded that the examined trades resulted in the movement of 
wetlands from highly populated urban and suburban areas to less-populated rural areas. 
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One way to avoid functional trade-offs and so increase prospects for the success of a 
credit resale program would involve setting compensation requirements in terms of separate 
wetlands functions rather than for the wetlands asset itself. Then, the credit resale program could 
define credits in terms of wetlands habitat functions, separate from other wetlands functions. The 
habitat functions are the ones that should be the most mobile across the landscape. For both the 
ability to support habitat (e.g., ensure that it is not in the midst of parking lots) and to add to a 
landscape mosaic that places wetlands in their upland context, the habitat functions should be 
replaced away from fill sites using wetlands types that best fit and will persist in that off-site 
location. Indeed, what may be more appropriate is thinking not at the watershed scale but at 
larger eco-region scales when seeking compensation for habitat functions. Although habitat 
functions lost to permitted fills must be offset through off-site credits, the compensation  
wetlands need not be of the same type affected by the fills they serve. Instead, credit success 
might be defined by wetlands hydrology and the extent to which the wetlands type that emerges 
is suited to the chosen landscape setting. The required compensation for habitat functions  
lost to permitted fills could be defined on an acre-for-acre basis, thus ensuring NNL in wetlands 
area as well as habitat functions. In sum, if the credit resale program were to focus on wetlands 
habitat functions, the agency that issues RFPs could seek habitat credits over spatially large and 
diverse areas, thus increasing the pool of land parcels that would be suitable mitigation sites.41 
This in turn would be expected to increase the level of competition for credit sales contracts 
while minimizing the extent to which prospective credit sellers might bid up prices for suitable 
land parcels. 
If the wetlands credit resale program were used to secure compensation for only the 
habitat functions lost to permitted fills, regulators would still need to secure compensation for 
any lost hydrologic and water-quality functions. In effect, if wetlands regulators determine that a 
permitted fill would result in the loss of water-quality and hydrologic functions, then the 
permittee would be subject to a two-part compensation requirement: one for habitat credits 
secured through the credit resale program, and one for site-dependent functions to be provided 
on-site or in close proximity to the permitted fill. Some Corps districts are already increasingly 
                                                 
41 These compensation wetlands secured through the RFP process would be expected to also provide water-quality 
or hydrologic functions for the area where they are located. However, the RFP process would seek only to replace—
and bidders would compete only to provide—wetlands habitat. But if the off-site credits could be demonstrated to 
provide water-quality or hydrologic restoration benefits to a watershed, these benefits should be identified, and 
additional payments for these services could be made through other programs. For example, a wastewater treatment 
plant might purchase water-quality credits as offsets for an increase in permitted discharge (see Shabman, 
Stephenson, and Shobe, 2001 for a description of this use of offsets).  
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using such two-part mitigation requirements to ensure adequate compensation for the full suite of 
wetlands functions lost to permitted fills.42 
In determining any needed on-site offsets for location-dependent functions, regulators 
would appropriately consider on-site wetlands mitigation as well as possible non-wetlands means 
of securing compensation. Site design changes (e.g., low-impact development), storm-water 
ponds, pervious pavement, riparian buffers, and a host of other methods can be substitutes for the 
water-quality and hydrologic functions of a wetland area (Center for Watershed Protection, 
2000) and can be implemented on or near the sites of permitted fills. Such non-wetlands 
compensation requirements are already in place in many areas. A variety of local and state 
regulatory programs governing land development currently require actions to mitigate for the 
hydrologic and water-quality effects of land development, including EPA storm-water 
management responsibilities and permitting requirements. These non-wetlands mitigation 
programs might often obviate the need for wetlands regulators to secure compensation for lost 
water-quality and hydrologic functions through on-site wetlands mitigation.  
Of course, recognition of non-wetlands means of securing compensation for these lost 
wetlands functions would require wetlands regulators to coordinate with the relevant non-
wetlands programs. The responsibility for assuring this coordination could fall to the agency 
charged as the credit reseller. It would be a logical responsibility given the importance that this 
separation of functions has for the success of the credit resale program and given the watershed 
planning function that would be the responsibility of the credit reseller. It would also require that 
wetlands regulators have access to easy and inexpensive methods for assessing lost water-quality 
and hydrologic functions and the extent to which potential offsets can replicate these functions. 
This access should be readily possible since a suite of assessment models applicable at different 
scales now exists, as well as easily applied rules of thumb that are used in storm-water and other 
water-quality management programs that could be used to make these calculations of loss and 
required offsets. At least one Corps district has already begun to encourage and approve 
mitigation proposals that incorporate low-impact development in conjunction with off-site 
habitat mitigation, particularly for permitted impacts on streams. That district has also actively 
                                                 
42 For example, mitigation guidance in the Corps Ft. Worth District states, “In some cases, it may be acceptable to 
provide partial compensation at multiple locations. For example, compensation for lost flood storage and sediment 
trapping functions might be required on-site while compensation for lost wildlife habitat might be allowed at another 
location.” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Fort Worth District, Mitigation and the Section 404 Regulatory Program. 
Draft. May 28, 2002. Page 2)  
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coordinated with relevant state and local agencies on procedures and assessment methods for use 
in this context.43 
4.3. The North Carolina Experience: Lessons for a Credit Resale Program 
The North Carolina Ecosystem Enhancement Program (NCEEP)44 is a recent experiment 
with a form of credit reselling that demonstrates the practicality of the approach while also 
illustrating pitfalls and challenges. NCEEP was motivated by a widespread dissatisfaction  
with delays in permit approval for North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) 
highway projects, driven in part by the need to develop and approve mitigation proposals  
for such projects.45 The regulatory slowdown in construction that resulted was, to a lesser  
extent, perceived as a general problem for other forms of development as well.46 The solution 
was to create a program that would allow for securing mitigation offsets (credits) in advance of 
fill impacts. 
4.3.1. NCEEP Features 
The operation of NCEEP is based on four key features. First, the North Carolina 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (NCDENR) signed an MOA with the Corps 
district office that established a preference for use of NCEEP credits for all NCDOT projects, 
after NCDOT affirms that it has applied the same sequencing (avoid, minimize, then mitigate) as 
                                                 
43 The Corps Norfolk District Office encourages mitigation packages for stream impacts that include various low-
impact development measures to help support stream water-quality and base flows in conjunction with off-site 
stream restoration or preservation to compensate for lost habitat functions (personal correspondence with Steve 
Martin, Corps Norfolk District Regulatory Branch). The district, together with several state and local agencies, 
jointly sponsored five workshops in 2003 that sought public input on how low-impact development practices should 
be considered in the review of development projects. Since then, this partnership has finalized a report on public 
comments received; formed a workgroup that includes all relevant agencies and stakeholders; and developed an 
action plan, a site design checklist, and runoff calculations worksheets 
(http://www.nao.usace.army.mil/regulatory/lid.htm).  
44 NCEEP covers mitigation for permitted impacts to wetlands, stream, and riparian buffers and offers nutrient 
offsets to municipal and industrial sources of pollution that exceed their allowed nutrient discharges. The focus here 
is on program elements that provide mitigation for permitted fills to wetlands. 
45 The discussion that follows draws upon interviews with Ron Ferrell and Suzanne Klimek, former and current 
administrators, respectively, of NCEEP. In addition, credit providers to NCEEP, Rich Mogensen of Earthmark and 
George Howard of Restoration Systems, provided valuable comments. More information on the program is available 
at the NCEEP website (http://www.nceep.net).  
46 The quality of the mitigation that was being done by NCDOT was not the motivation for NCEEP. Instead, many 
resource agencies felt that too often mitigation was viewed as an afterthought in the development process, and these 
agencies wanted a more proactive approach to securing mitigation in advance of fill impacts.  
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any other permittee. In principle, NCEEP could then predict NCDOT credit needs in watersheds 
across the state. A rough projection of future credit needs by area of the state is possible because 
NCDOT has a seven-year road-building plan with sufficient detail that likely road corridors, if 
not specific routes, can be mapped. 
The MOA also references an earlier MOA that recognizes NCEEP as an approved ILF 
administrator, meaning that NCEEP can accept payments for mitigating permitted fills and 
undertake credit production projects with the collected fees. In the MOA NCEEP agrees that by 
2014, it will have mitigation credits in place five years in advance of an NCDOT permit being 
issued. This advanced mitigation requires up-front capital to invest in the production of needed 
credits. Therefore, the second program feature that distinguishes NCEEP from traditional ILF 
programs is the access to funds to support NCEEP credit production responsibilities. At times 
funds have been provided by the state; however, at this time the bulk of program funding is 
provided by NCDOT. 
Watershed-scale planning to set watershed restoration priorities to establish the kinds of 
credits desired is a third feature of the program. Related to these plans, programmatic planning 
by the NCDENR links the projected need for credits of particular types and in particular 
locations to mitigation projects that can meet those needs. These planning products are expected 
to match the NCDOT projections of highway development with specific credit needs. 
A fourth feature of NCEEP is reliance on RFPs to secure credits in watersheds where fills 
are projected to occur and for the kinds of projects that will restore wetlands that are identified as 
high priority by the NCEEP watershed planning process. RFPs are issued for watersheds where 
impacts are projected to occur and for the kinds of projects that will restore wetlands that are 
identified as high priority by the NCEEP planning process. The RFPs are for what the program 
refers to as “full delivery” projects; it is the availability of upfront funding that allows NCEEP to 
issue RFPs for such completed turn-key projects.47 
The winning bidders are selected and then paid on a schedule that is built into a contract 
referenced in the RFP. The requirements in the RFPs are related to and derived from the quality 
assurance requirements placed on traditional private credit sellers under the MBRT process. To 
date about 50% of the predicted mitigation credits have contracted out for full delivery by 
                                                 
47 RFPs can be found at http://www.ips.state.nc.us/ips/deptbids.asp. Look under the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources to see RFPs requesting wetland, stream, and buffer mitigation in various river basins. Also see 
http://www.nceep.net/business/rfps.htm. 
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NCEEP and its predecessor programs. The rest of the credits are created under the supervision of 
NCEEP staff, although competitively selected contractors complete individual components of 
these projects. The winning bidders in the full delivery RFP process are selected and then paid 
on a defined schedule as ecological success is documented. NCEEP has the responsibility for 
selling the credits produced by the program to NCDOT and to other permit recipients in need of 
credits. The payments required of NCDOT (the fee) are tied to the costs of securing the 
successful wetlands (or stream) restoration or creation through the bid process, addressing the 
criticism that traditional ILF programs do not always include the full costs of producing credits 
in the fee rates they charge. The repayment process is expected to work so that NCDOT (the 
permittee) pays NCEEP for costs it incurs on a schedule that is governed by the outlays NCEEP 
makes to the successful bidders and for NCEEP’s own in-house projects. The payments required 
for non-NCDOT users are based on an administratively established fee schedule. 
4.3.2 Issues and Lessons from NCEEP 
The NCEEP program, with its RFP process for offsetting NCDOT impacts, is a truly 
innovative approach to securing wetlands credits. In its design it appears to aspire to the 
conceptual ideal of the credit resale program described above. However, several “growing pains” 
in the program have become matters of controversy and will need to be debated and then 
addressed. Below we comment on these current debates relating to the role of private credit 
providers and ways to strengthen the RFP process.48 
At the current time some NCEEP funds are used for in-house investment, defined as a 
credit production process under the direction of NCEEP agency staff, with contracts let for each 
stage of credit production except land identification and acquisition. The RFP process is referred 
to as procurement for full-delivery projects, where the mitigation provider is responsible for all 
aspects of credit development. NCEEP will continue to provide in-house credits, but credit 
providers argue that any in-house credit production thins the demand for private credits and 
reduces the chance of having a winning bid. This can discourage competition among (and the 
number of) possible sellers because there is less overall business to secure. In addition, it reduces 
the likelihood of any single seller being successful, creates uncertainty regarding which areas 
                                                 
48 An example of a related topic under debate is the needed degree of precision in data and modeling for watershed 
planning—and the needed planning funds. At present NCEEP spends about 3% of its budget on developing 
watershed plans designed to identify priority problems in watersheds across the state. This planning is less 
controversial that another facet of NCEEP planning: identifying and selecting mitigation sites. Credit providers view 
site identification as a part of their responsibility, while NCEEP staff feels a responsibility to identify the best sites 
for credit production projects.  
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will need private-sector participation, and generally diminishes the long-term interest of 
prospective credit providers in participating in the RFP process. All other factors being equal, 
maintaining the current trend to full delivery projects will increase the demand for full delivery 
credits by reducing in-house credit supply. This said, NCEEP staff argues that the future credit 
demands are far in excess of what the private-sector providers can deliver. In fact multiple credit 
delivery mechanisms, including payments to resources agencies, may be needed over time to 
meet credit demands. For this reason they see a need to have multiple mechanisms for the 
provision of credits. 
However the exact split among private and public credit providers develops, there is 
widespread agreement that full delivery projects built by private credit providers are an essential 
component for program success. Therefore, the promise of the RFP process as a foundation for a 
credit resale program requires a continuing competition among private credit providers while 
securing the quality and quantity of credits identified by the watershed planning process. We 
now turn attention to current debates over the RFP process. 
After several years of using the bidding process in NCEEP and its predecessor ILF 
program, there is still a debate over whether bid prices are still too high. In the view of some 
parties, the benchmark has been published state prices for credits based on NCEEP estimates of 
costs for producing in-house credits. But critics of NCEEP cost estimates assert that these cost 
estimates do not fully reflect all costs incurred by the state.49 Another complaint of private credit 
providers is that the assurance requirements on full delivery projects seem to be redundant; 
technical reviews, credit release schedules, and financial assurances are all required to address 
the same issue: the prospect of credit failure.50 Our own view is that reliance on financial 
assurances as the primary mechanism for protecting NCEEP against credit failure would be a 
sufficient safeguard. While disagreement on these issues remain, there is now a common view 
that NCEEP should continuously review the structure of the RFP process to assure that the 
process is competitive and does not impose redundant costs for securing the credit quality 
desired, and all parties should accept the results of a competitive RFP process as the true cost of 
credit production. 
                                                 
49 For example, full cost accounting would include employee costs, the opportunity cost of capital, RFP application 
costs, the market valuation of land (even if the projects are on public lands), and the allocation of costs for NCEEP 
staff to in-house credit projects.  
50 One possible reason for this redundancy is that the NCEEP does not want to get caught short of credits if the 
private-sector winning bidder does not deliver. At the same time, there is some unease among staff at the resource 
management agencies about private entrepreneurs “making money” on environmental improvement. 
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A second concern is the cost for prospective bidders to participate in the RFP process in 
relation to the expected returns. There appear to be new participants (willing sellers) in the last 
round of RFPs, suggesting that new companies may be coming in. But it is unknown how 
significant or widespread this increase in competing credit sellers will prove to be over time. For 
the entry of new bidders to persist, the returns to the business must cover long-term costs.51 
Because bidders face uncertain success in winning a bid, the costs to be a qualified bidder are 
significant in relation to the expected value of the return. NCEEP will need to develop ways to 
reduce the cost of participating in the RFP process, perhaps by having an early screening 
process. More generally, the NCEEP process would be more likely to prosper if more states 
adopted similar credit resale programs. Then there would be more companies operating, more 
opportunities to win a bid and enhanced competition among companies. North Carolina could 
perhaps take leadership, regionally and nationally, in expanding the number of similar programs 
to more states. Such an effort might be coordinated with the Association of State Wetlands 
Managers or the National Governors Association. Furthermore, a partnership with the Corps, 
EPA, the Federal Highway Administration, the private mitigation bankers association, and others 
would be possible and valuable in expanding the credit resale approach to more areas 
nationwide. 
In addition, we believe that prospects for the expansion and success of the credit resale 
approach would be advanced if compensation requirements were established in terms of 
individual wetlands functions lost to permitted fills. Currently, the federal wetlands mitigation 
program defines compensation requirements in terms of the wetland asset itself (area and 
aggregate functions), rather than in terms of its separable functions. We believe that regulators 
should recognize the ecological logic for defining compensation by function and seek functional 
replacement through coordination of multiple programs. Then the wetlands credit resale program 
could focus on providing compensation for habitat functions, while other programs could be used 
to secure water-quality and hydrologic functions. This would be environmentally preferable and 
could support more robust competition in the RFP process. In fact, North Carolina has the ability 
to quickly move in this direction. North Carolina’s Section 401 Water Quality Certification 
Process and the multiple local watershed protection and storm-water management requirements 
already secure at least partial on-site compensation for water-quality and hydrologic effects of 
development in local watersheds. Indeed, another program within NCEEP actually supports 
                                                 
51 The costs of the RFP process, when compared with the MBRT process faced by private credit sellers (commercial 
mitigation bankers), favors NCEEP. Clearly, demand uncertainty for the bidder is far lower under the RFP process, 
if the bid is won. In the RFP process the state is a buyer, but not all bidders can be successful in every competition. 
29 Resources for the Future  Shabman and Scodari 
 
these efforts. Under that program, local governments are expected to require new development 
(which may include some wetlands filling) to implement on-site storm-water controls and then to 
make payments to the NCEEP nutrient offset program for the financing of regional storm-water 
management practices to offset effects that are not mitigated on site. These programs could 
readily be meshed with the wetlands mitigation program, allowing the wetlands RFP process to 
focus on securing compensation for wetlands habitat, together with a parallel RFP process to 
focus on securing water-quality offsets. 
Finally, for a credit resale program to work effectively, there needs to be a dedicated fund 
to capitalize advanced credit production. In NCEEP, NCDOT has provided that capital, which 
has allowed the state to build the program infrastructure (planning, administrative staff, and so 
on) for an operating credit resale program. However, the program is mostly limited to providing 
compensation wetlands for NCDOT impacts. NCDOT provides the funds to pay NCEEP to 
compensate it for the actual costs to implement the projects that offset NCDOT’s own future 
(predicted) permit impacts. NCDOT may err by overstating their impacts and credit needs, but 
they (through NCEEP) can save the extra credits for use in future years. However, for non-
NCDOT impacts, there is no dedicated funding for advanced credit production. The program 
does accept fees from permittees, usually from recipients of nationwide permits (small fills), but 
the fee is fixed by an administrative action and may not be tied to the actual costs of 
implementing projects. As a result, for non-NCDOT impacts, a time lag remains in implementing 
credit production, and there is no assurance that the fees charged are linked to the full cost of 
securing that compensation. Three actions to address this gap would be for the state to draw on 
revolving fund sources to capitalize this feature of the program and undertake advanced credit 
production, for the state to replace the fixed fee schedule with cost-based fee rates, and for the 
state to merge the NCDOT program with the non-DOT program. 
5. Conclusions 
The wetlands NNL goal is compromised when Section 404 permittees provide low-
quality credits to offset the loss of wetlands area and functions caused by their fills. To address 
this problem, private entrepreneurs have been encouraged to invest in wetlands restoration 
projects to earn a return on investment by selling the resulting wetlands credits to permit 
recipients. Quality control requirements, including the posting of financial assurances for 
ecological success, assure that private credit sellers provide high-quality credits. However, 
barriers to widespread market entry have limited investment in credit production in many areas 
of the country, and where credits are available, high credit prices can discourage use of this 
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mitigation option by permittees. As a result, most compensation wetlands (credits) continue to be 
provided by permittees, with the attendant problems that have been well documented. An 
alternative is needed. We call this alternative a credit resale program. 
In a credit resale program a wetlands mitigation authority—akin to an ILF 
administrator—relies on the private sector for supplying quality-assured credits. Private sellers 
would compete with each other to provide credits that would be purchased by the mitigation 
authority and then resold to permittees at fee rates sufficient to recover the costs of credit 
procurement. In this way, the benefits of competition can be secured even when there are few 
direct buyers and sellers of credits. The administration of a credit resale program requires a 
planning process to identify watershed restoration priorities for wetlands (habitat) and a process 
for predicting future permitting and associated demand for credits by type and location. In 
addition, a credit resale program must be built on a financial foundation that provides up-front 
capital to pay for the advanced credit production secured through an RFP process. NCEEP 
represents one promising effort at establishing a form of credit resale program. There are 
growing pains in the NCEEP program, but it is an effort to combine the strengths of private-
sector credit providers and ILF programs to secure adequate compensation wetlands for wetlands 
fill permits. 
We offer three broad suggestions for advancing the expansion and success of credit resale 
programs across the nation. First, the concept would be more likely to prosper if additional states 
implemented a credit resale program. Then there would be more companies operating, more 
opportunities to win a bid, and enhanced competition among companies. The state of North 
Carolina might take leadership, regionally and nationally, in seeking to encourage credit resale 
programs in more states. Such an effort might be advanced through a partnership with the 
Association of State Wetlands Managers or the National Governors Association, the Corps, EPA, 
the Federal Highway Administration, and the private mitigation bankers association. 
Second, for a credit resale program to work effectively, there must be a dedicated fund to 
capitalize advanced credit production projects. As has been the case in North Carolina, state 
departments of transportation can be sources of initial capital that can allow states to build 
program infrastructure (planning, administrative staff, and so on) for an operating credit resale 
program. However, a fully functional program cannot be limited to wetlands impacts from 
transportation projects. Each state should draw on revolving fund sources, in coordination with 
department of transportation funds, to capitalize the program and undertake advanced 
compensation wetlands projects for credit production and resale to permit recipients. 
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Third, we believe that a credit resale program would work best (as would any wetlands 
compensatory mitigation program) if compensation requirements for permitted fills were set for 
separate functions and if off-site and out-of-kind replacement are allowed for some of those 
functions. Functional replacement for site-dependent water-quality and hydrologic functions 
generally needs to be near the fill site. However, for the replacement of these functions, various 
non-wetlands offsets should be allowed as substitutes for wetlands mitigation, and there should 
be close coordination between regulatory requirements for wetlands and for other programs 
(such as storm-water management) that are mutually concerned with mitigating for the negative 
water-quality and hydrologic impacts of development. For the replacement of wetlands  
habitat functions, a landscape perspective demands that the compensation wetlands be placed  
in a hydrologic and uplands setting where the wetlands can self-design and will not be  
threatened over time by development. Such wetlands habitat replacement can be done in areas 
that are somewhat remote from the sites of the permitted wetlands fills for which they are  
used to provide habitat compensation. This is what is meant by a watershed approach to 
compensatory mitigation. 
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